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Geddie: Public Employee Strikes

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
Calvin Coolidge, while still the Governor of Massachusetts,
said in 1919 that "there can be no right to strike against the
public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time."' This concise
statement represented the general public feeling that strikes by
public employees were simply intolerable, 2 and it continues to
be the position of a majority of the states. However, in other
states, changing circumstances in the public employment area
have forced governments to re-examine the policy of prohibiting
strikes by public employees.
In recent years, the most spectacular growth industry in the
United States has been government at all levels. Presently one
sixth of the total work force is employed by some level of government. 4 By 1970 one out of every five employed persons -will
be a public employee, and by 1980 the ratio will have increased
to one in every four. 5 The result of this rapid growth has been
an erosion of the traditional civil service concept of prohibiting
strikes against the government." This break with tradition is
shown by the recent upsurge of teacher strikes across the country. During the 1967-1968 school year, one hundred sixty three
thousand teachers in twenty-one states went on strike. 7 This
figure represented the loss of nearly one and one half million
man-days of work, or approximately eighty per cent of the total
work time lost since 1940.8
The following discussion of public employee strikes will examine the differences between public and private employees to
explain the different treatment afforded them by various governments. Further this note will analyze the present statutes to
1. 1 LAB. L.J. 612 (1950).

2. LiFE, Mar. 1, 1968, at 4.

3. Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54
Cal. 2d 684, 355 P2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960) ; International Longshoremen's
Ass'n. v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill.
2d 567, 207 N.E2d 427 (1965); Delaware River & Bay Authority v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965);
Gremminger v. Eyre, 417 Pa. 461, 208 A.2d 263 (1965) ; City of Pawtucket v.
Teachers Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958) ; City of Alcoa v. Electrical Workers Local 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957).
4. ATLA~ic MoxpnLy, Jan., 1968, at 46.
5. Weisenfeld, Public Emloyees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAi.
L.J. 685, 687 (1965).
6. ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan., 1968, at 46.
7. U.S. N-ws & WoRLD REPORT, Dec. 30, 1968, at 12.
8. Id.
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determine their effectiveness in dealing with the problems created by the public employee labor movement, and propose new
methods to improve the existing law.
I. PUBLIC EMPLOUMENT COMPARED WITH PILVATE EM PIOYMEN.ZT

Although a constitutional right to strike has never been recognized, employees of private industry can and do strike. Until
recently there has been little apparent desire on the part of
public employees to organize and strike. The main reason for
this inactivity has been that the poor working conditions and
low salaries that prompted the labor movement in the private
sector were not present in public employment. Now, however, in
many areas the private employee enjoys many benefits not available to the public employee. This change has resulted primarily
from the use of collective bargaining in the private sector. Collective bargaining has progressed at a slower rate in the public
employment area.
Because of the public nature of a government, the options
available to it in the event of a labor dispute are somewhat
limited. 9 Government, as a business enterprise, is a monopoly
operated for the benefit of all the people. The chief concern of
a government is providing social services for its citizens. Private
industries, however, are organized solely for the purpose of making a profit. Thus in the event of a strike, the private employer
may choose simply to go out of business if this action would be
the most feasible economically. A government, however, cannot
simply go out of business because of the essential nature of the
services which it provides. 10
The ability of a government to meet the increased costs of
employee demands may be somewhat less than the ability of a
private employer to respond to an increase in the cost of doing
business by passing it along to his customers. Generally a private company can increase its revenue by raising the price of its
goods or services. This procedure would be relatively simple in
most industries; although in a few highly competitive industries,
it may be impossible. A government, however, relies mainly
upon tax receipts to supply the bulk of its operating cash. Generally speaking, it is more difficult to raise taxes than to raise
the price of a commodity, because politicians are fearful of the
consequences of an unpopular tax increase.
9. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1951); 70 W. VA. L. REv. 456 (1968).

10. Waldman, Damage Actions and Other Remedies in the Public Employee

Strike, 20 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 259 (1967).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss5/4

2

Geddie: Public Employee Strikes
1969]

NoTEs

Policy decisions in private industry are made by a relatively
small number of persons who have a voice in the control of the
business, whereas every citizen has some degree of control over
the functions of his government." Thus a government is more
responsive to public opinion than a private business. Public
sentiment during a public employee strike could be either sympathetic or antagonistic toward government. Any public inconvenience, such as a police strike, could cause the removal of the
government officials in power by the elective process. On the
other hand, if governments constantly appease their employees
by meeting their demands, thereby avoiding strikes, the resulting rise in taxes could also cause the incumbent officials to lose
their jobs. These political pressures place public officials in the
very difficult position of trying to decide what procedure to
follow in the event of a labor dispute, striving at all times to
continue the services necessary for the public welfare.12
Underlying every theory against public employee strikes is
the public policy argument against them. Governments have
been called an extension of the will of the people, and it has
been said to be against public policy for anyone to strike against
the will of the people.' 3 Public employees serve for the benefit
of all the people and every public employee should do his part
to make government function as efficiently and economically as
possible. 14 Moreover an effectively organized strike by public
employees could endanger the very life of the government itself.
If policemen went on strike during a riot, or firemen during a
disaster, complete panic could ensue. Thus governments are faced
with this problem: they must try to promote good relations
between themselves and their employees and at the same time
insure the orderly and uninterrupted performance of their governmental functions and services.

II.PRxsExT LAwS

AND

THm Enmacv

xEss

Act' i

The National Labor Relations
established as national
policy the right of workers in industries affecting interstate
11. Annot., 31 A.L.R2d 1142 (1951); ThiE, Mar. 1, 1968, at 34.

12. Waldman, Damage Actions and Other Remedies in the Public Employee
Strike, 20 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAD. 259 (1967) ; Wall Street Journal, Mar. 10, 1967,
at 8, col. 1.
13. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946);
International Long Shoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712,
124 S.E.2d 733 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962).
14. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1951).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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commerce to organize unions to improve their working conditions. However, the Act does not include government employees. 16 Federal employees, by statute,1 7 are prohibited from
taking part in any strike against the government. President
Kennedy, by executive order,18 directed federal agencies to
recognize qualifying employee organizations. Qualifying organizations do not include those that assert the right to strike
against the Government. There are federal employee unions today, but it has been held that they do not have the right to
strike 0 and federal law imposes very stringent penalties upon
striking employees. 20 Not only is the violation of this statute
a felony, but also the statute provides for the dismissal of any
employee who participates in any strike against the federal
21
government.
Although there has been very little controversy over the
right of federal employees to organize and strike, the controversy is growing larger every day at the state and municipal
level. It has been held that the National Labor Relations Act
does not apply to municipal22 or state employees 23 and as a
result of this holding, many states have enacted statutes that
prohibit strikes by public employees.2 4 The purpose of these
statutes is to prevent public strikes at all costs.
A policy consideration underlying all of the state no-strike
statutes is the belief that harsh punishment will serve as a
deterrent against any public employee strike. Thus these statutes
16. 29 U.S.C. § 152.2 (1964).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964).

Id.

An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States . .. if he . . . (3) participates in a
strike or asserts the right to strike against the Government of the
United States . . . (4) is a member of an organization of employees . . . that he knows asserts the right to strike against the
Government of the United States .

18. Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962).

For an analysis of the

order, see Barr, Executive Order 10988: An Experiment in Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, 52 GEo. L.J. 420 (1964).
19. Eustace v. Day, 198 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1961).

20. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1964). "Whoever violates § 7311 of title 5 shall be
fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or
both." Id.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964).
22. City of Alcoa v. Electrical Workers Local 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W2d
476 (1957).
23. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga.
712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 92? (1962).
24. The following states have statutes prohibiting strikes by public employees: Fla., Hawaii, Mich., Minn., Neb., N.Y., Ohio, Pa., Tex., and Va.
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usually impose severe penalties for violation of the no-strike
provisions but neglect to provide any mechanism for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes.2 5 This neglect has been called
the fatal mistake of the states in their effort to curb public
26
employee strikes.
In an effort to correct such statutory deficiencies, the CondonWadlin Act of New York 27 was repealed. In its place, the Public
Employees' Fair Employment Act, also known as the Taylor
Law, was enacted.2 8 The purpose of the Taylor Law was to promote good relations between government and its employees and
at the same time to secure the uninterrupted operation of government. 29 The new law gives public employees the right to
organize unions to represent them,3 0 and requires the state or
local government to recognize the unions and negotiate with
them. 3 ' Further it creates an impartial fact finding board to
help solve disputes between public employers and their employees,3 2 and it imposes stringent penalties on violaters, including fines of up to ten thousand dollars a day, and loss of the
dues check-off privilege for a period not longer than eighteen
months.

33

The effectiveness of the Taylor Law has been tested several
times in the two years that the law has been on the books, and
the results have been disappointing.34 During the New York
City sanitation workers strike, tons of garbage piled up on the
streets resulting in a major health emergency. Finally after the
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan., 1968, at 46.
26. Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citlizens, 16 LAB.
L.J. 685 (1965); 70 W. VA. L. REv. 456 (1968).
27. N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 1082 (McKinney 1959).

25.

No person holding a position by appointment or employment in
the government of the state of New York, or in the government of
the several cities, counties, towns or villages thereof . . . shall
strike; (4) Any public employee who violates the provisions of this
section shall thereby abandon and terminate his employment and
shall no longer hold such position ....

Id.
28. N.Y. Civ. SEnv. §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
29. Id. § 200.
30. Id. § 202. "Public employees shall have the right to form, join, and
participate in

...

any employee organization of their own choosing." Id.

31. Id. § 203. "Public employees shall have the right to be represented by
employee organizations to negotiate collectively with their public employers in
the determination of their terms and conditions of employment, and administration of grievances arising thereunder." Id.
32. Id. § 205.
33. Id. § 210 2(f).
34. Collins, Labor Relation.r Law, 1967 Survey of N.Y. Law, 19 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 308 (1967).
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union had been fined and its president sentenced to jail, an
agreement was reached to submit the dispute to binding arbitration.a5 In the 1967 New York City teacher strike, the impartial
board set up by the Taylor Law recommended a sizeable wage
increase for the teachers; however, the American Federation of
Teachers rejected the board's recommendation and struck the
New York City schools in open defiance of the Taylor Law. 6
The strike involved forty-six thousand teachers, and more than
four hundred thousand pupils stayed away from school.3

7

Under

tremendous pressure, the New York Supreme Court issued an
injunction against the strike, but the local union ignored the
injunction. As a result of this defiance, the union was fined and
its president sentenced to jail.38 In both of the above instances,
the procedures set up by the Taylor Law failed to prevent the
strikes and the governments involved finally had to resort to the
use of an injunction to end the strikes.
The injunction is more frequently used as a weapon against
striking employees than the harsh punishments prescribed by
the statutes. 39 Most of the old statutes provided for the dismissal of striking employees 40 but this penalty was impractical. For
example, a school system could not hope to replace all the teachers in the system if they were dismissed as a result of a strike.
Accordingly school administrators would seek an injunction
against an illegal strike rather than exercise their statutory
authority to dismiss the striking teachers. 41 These injunctions
are often disobeyed by the striking organizations. If the injunction is ignored, the court which issued it may of course use its
contempt power to compel obedience. Under its contempt power
the court could imprison union officials or levy fines against the
defiant union; however, the effectiveness of a fine in ending the
strike is doubtful. In the New York City teacher strike a fine
of ten thousand dollars per day was imposed upon the striking
union. Although this fine seemed quite large, after it had been
passed on to the union members it amounted to less than one
dollar per day per member. Moreover the incarceration of the
union leaders can often lead to an undesirable result. During the
35. FAcTs ON FILE, Feb. 2-10, 1968, at 63.
36. N.Y. CIV. SERv. § 210.1 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
37. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
38. Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct
1967); 70 W. VA. L. REv. 456 (1968).
39. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1951).
40. N.Y. Civ. Stov. § 108 (McKinney 1959).
41. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1951); "tmr, Sept. 29, 1967, at 77.
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New York teacher strike, the president of the union, Albert
AShanker, was jailed. 42 Not only was this action unsuccessful in
ending the strike, but it also served to make Shanker a martyr
to the striking teachers. Therefore even an injunction may be
a relatively ineffective weapon against large groups of public
employee strikers.
In summary the existing laws are generally somewhat archaic
in design, and extremely rigid and inflexible in operation. They
prescribe penalties for violating their provisions without setting
up the machinery for solving the problems which led to the violations. Moreover the alleged deterrent effect of the harsh penalties has not materialized, as is shown by the sharp increase in
the number of public employee strikes. Public employees want
to have some degree of control over their working conditions,
and they are rightfully entitled to it. The present statutes, with
the possible exception of the Taylor Law, offer public employees
no alternative to the illegal strike.

III.

Tn

PROBLEm in SouTH CARoLINA

South Carolina, although it has no statutes dealing with the
problem of public employee strikes, would undoubtedly follow
the lead of the other states by prohibiting any strikes by public
employees. 43 The reason given for this conclusion is that the
compensation of public employees is regulated by legislative
appropriations, and as the legislature carries out the will of the
people, any strike to force demands upon the legislature would
be against public policy. This is the traditional view concerning
public employee strikes. 44 South Carolina cannot consider itself
immune from public employee strikes. Certain groups, such as
teachers in some localities, have already taken steps toward
unionization.45 The recent conflicts with the non-professional
hospital workers in Charleston further show the urgent need for
a well defined state policy dealing with the problem of public
employee strikes.
If South Carolina's right to work law46 is construed to apply

to public employees, there could be no restrictions on union
42. Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S2d 548 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
43. [1963-19641 S.C. ATr'y GEN. ANNUAL RFP. 298.

44. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217
Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962).
45. The State, Oct. 26, 1968, at 1 B.
46. S.C. CoDz ANN. §§ 40-46 (1962).
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membership as a condition of employment, either to require
membership or to prohibit it. Some authorities feel that a right
47
to work statute does not apply to government employees.
Texas, which also has a right to work law, holds that state
employees may join unions, but that they do not have the right
to strike.48 Several other states are in accord with this position 49

which represents the modern trend."0

Unions are not a prerequisite to any public employee strike.
The recent teacher strike in Florida was conducted by the Florida Education Association, which is similar to the South Carolina Education Association. Both organizations are members of
the National Education Association (NEA), which has long
prided itself on being a "professional" organization. The NEA
has traditionally opposed any strikes by teachers, but has recently authorized the invoking of "sanctions" against school systems.
These sanctions take the form of discouraging both present and
prospective employees from teaching in the particular school
system, and they are designed to put pressure on governments
to act promptly to remove the possible causes of strikes. Recently some South Carolina teachers have investigated the possibility of requesting the NEA to impose sanctions on South
Carolina. These actions, along with the confrontations in
Charleston, show an urgent need for legislation to set up a
peaceful procedure to settle labor disputes with public employees
before they ever reach the strike stage.
IV. POSSmLE SOLUTIONs TO THE PROBLEM

The public employee strikes that have taken place so far have
proved to be highly successful for the strikers. 51 As a result of
these successes, there will be an almost certain rise in the number
of public employee strikes. To combat this rise, it will be necessary for governments at all levels to set up procedures to settle
disputes and thereby avoid strikes.
One solution is to increase the fines imposed for violating a
47. [1963-1964] S.C. Arr'y GEN. ANNuAL REP. 298.
48. Dallas Ind. School Dist. v. State Employees Local 1442, 330 S.W.2d
702 (Tex. 1959).

49. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W. 539 (1947); Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611, 88 A.2d 878 (1952) ; Transit Local 1338 v. Dallas
Pub. Transit Bd., 430 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1968).
50. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1951).
51. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, Mar. 24, 1968, at 2 D; N.Y. Times, Dec.
19, 1967, at 41, col. 4.
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prohibition against strikes. Proponents of this theory point to
the large fines imposed on John L. Lewis and the United Mine
Workers, which effectively ended the 1946 coal miners walkout.52 Underlying the theory of greater fines is the idea that if

strikes cannot be prevented, they can at least be made unprofitable to the unions. In addition to increased fines, the check-off
privilege may be conditioned upon the absence of strikes (i.e., in
the event of a strike the privilege would automatically be
suspended). These two procedures were embodied in New York's
Taylor Law.53 They are, however, limited in their ability to
prevent strikes because they do not take effect until a strike has
begun.
Many people argue that although certain public employee
strikes are intolerable, others may be tolerated. This theory
draws a distinction between various jobs that are held by public
employees. The proponents of this theory argue that whereas
a strike by police officers could not be tolerated, a strike by
municipal golf course employees would scarcely affect the public. This standard has received some mention by the courts;54
however, serious doubts can be raised concerning its usefulness.
For example, on what side of the standard should teachers or
clerical workers be placed?. These employees could be considered
indispensible under one set of facts, whereas under other circumstances, their absence would have little effect (e.g., strikes by
school teachers could be tolerated during summer school but not
during the regular school term).55

Compulsory arbitration is often suggested by some people.5 6
Both labor and management oppose it in the private sector, but
there are indications that both employers and employees would
accept it in the public employment area.57 For compulsory arbitration to work, governments would have to first recognize the
right of the workers to organize. Once this right is recognized,
governments must then agree to negotiate with the labor organi52. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Although

this strike was not a public employee strike originally, the Court found that the

workers in the mines seized by the United States government were employees
of the federal government.
53. N.Y. Civ. SEav. § 210.3 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
54. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954) (where the
court found that employees of an agricultural district could strike) ; Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal.2d 684, 355
P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960) (held that transit workers could strike).
55. SATURDAY IFvIaw, Dec. 7, 1968, at 27.
56. LiFr, Mar. 1, 1968, at 4.
57. TmiE, Mar. 1, 1968, at 34.
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zations. The results of such negotiations would have to be binding on both parties if strikes are to be prevented; however, some
courts have held that a public employer cannot bargain away its
continuing legislative discretion, and therefore it may not enter
into collective bargaining agreements."" Thus a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer and its employees
may be invalidated on the ground that is an illegal delegation
of legislative power.
The greatest single need of the public employee is the right of
collective bargaining. This right must be limited, however; the
rules for private and public employment cannot be the same.
Powerful deterrents need to be set up to prevent any abuse of
power by a public labor organization. No law can completely
eliminate the possibility of a strike; however, some machinery
should be set up to entertain the legitimate complaints of public
employees. Governments can no longer in good faith refuse to
deal collectively with their own employees, and at the same time
impose a statutory duty upon private employers to deal collectively with their employees.59 Although there are differences
between the structures of private and public employers, the
plight of the worker is still the same. They have essentially the
same needs and desires concerning their work, be it public or
private. In the final analysis, whatever procedure for peaceful
settlement is set up, the future success of that procedure will
depend upon the skill, enterprise, and goodwill of the opposing
parties on both sides of the dispute.
L. GRAY

GEDDIE, JR.

58. State v. Brotherhood RLIL Trainmen, 37 Cal. 412, 232 P2d 857 (1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951) ; Fellows v. La Tronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377
P.2d 547 (1963) ; Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,
83 A.2d 482 (1951); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539
(1947).
59. Waldman, Damage Actiona and Other Remedies In The Public Employee Strike, 20 N.Y.U. CoN7. LAB. 259, 271 (1967).
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